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ABSTRACT 
This article looks at the experience of policing protests in Greece during 
the period of the crisis from the point of view of police officers. Policing 
in Greece – and especially the subjective experience of police officers 
themselves – is a non-subject of sociological research for historical and 
political reasons peculiar to Greece and exceeding usual opposition to 
police as a repressive state apparatus in Western states. The article 
relies on extensive qualitative work – based on semi-structured and 
unstructured interviews as well as observation – over a period of 
seventeen months. It stems from an ongoing project investigating the 
everyday experience of police officers and sheds light on topics such as 
the experience of policing protests, the use of the police by the state, 
the impact of the hierarchical structure of the institution on the 
subjectivity of police officers, their relative social isolation, their 
understandings of the use of violence and their political views. 
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Policing the crisis in Greece: 
The others’ side of the story 
 
1. Introduction: Police as a taboo subject of research 
 
Since 2010 Greece has undergone a period of intense and rapid 
economic and political transformation that has come to be known as 
‘the crisis’ – the outcome of austerity politics, the dismantling of the 
Welfare State and widespread pauperisation of the middle and lower 
classes. Public manifestations of such crisis include the burgeoning of 
protests and riots, especially during 2010-2014, with the 2011 summer 
of discontent as the most iconic moment of civil unrest. They also 
include the virtual disappearance of those parties that dominated the 
political scene since the restoration of democratic rule in Greece (1974), 
such as the once omnipotent PASOK (Socialist Party), and the emergence 
of political parties and formations lacking clear political identity, at least 
along the dividing lines of Left and Right as we have known them 
throughout the twentieth century. Examples include To Potami, or the 
River, which supports a reformist agenda that is nonetheless hard to 
politically profile. Other public manifestations of the crisis may be seen 
in the rise of political extremism, most notably of the far right and the 
infamous Golden Dawn, but also the ascent of a far Left party, SYRIZA, 
into State power and its ensuing fast transformation and loss of political 
identity.  As such, the very nature of the political system – parliamentary 
democracy – has been challenged and the State’s legitimacy has been 
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under constant scrutiny and subject to a general depreciation in the eyes 
of the public.  
The police as an institution is no exception to this crisis, but what is 
particularly interesting is the role that the police as a State apparatus is 
required and expected to play in situations of generalised discontent, 
which often result in open dissent or even clashes between citizens and 
the State/government. It is commonplace that law enforcement 
institutions are often targeted by protesting groups across the modern 
world: this is because by the very structure of the Western state the 
police upholds the role of suppressing dissent when deemed necessary 
and guarantees - via direct repression among other tactics (Althusser 
1970) - the continuity of the political system along with the protection   
of democratic institutions and the protection of the majority’s vote.  
For a variety of historical and political reasons detailed below, the Greek 
police as an institution with its own culture, values and worldviews have 
not yet been the object of sociological analysis. Historical research on 
the police as an institution is similarly almost non-existent (partially due 
to the fact that the opening of police archives only occurred in June 
2015), whilst social and political interest has been focusing on police 
misconduct, violence or transgression (Amnesty International 2012). A 
walk in the centre of Athens is instructive of the widespread rejection – 
even hate – against the police in Greece. Greek citizens are accustomed 
to expressions of such rejection expressed via graffiti and written 
slogans on the walls of urban centres. For years I have been accustomed 
to seeing these slogans, as well. It was only when I started doing this 
research that I asked myself what the reasons for such normalisation of 
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hate against the police may mean for the conscience collective – to use a 
Durkheimian term – of Greek society. What is the sociological and 
political function of such ideological identification, and what kind of 
function does this stigmatisation may perform? And why is that people 
may choose this profession given the ideological – and I would dare to 
say, even moral – stigma that is attached to it?  
This public rejection of the police has not only left a considerable gap in 
sociological knowledge but has made the police as a subject of research 
an a priori controversial one. Even more, if one aims to turn the gaze 
from police misconduct, or police violence, to the experience of ordinary 
policemen, to their experiences and views during the turmoil of the 
crisis, one enters the realm of taboo. There have been no previous 
attempts to study ordinary policemen not only as the ones who perform 
violence in the name of the State, and certainly not as one-dimensional 
and thoughtless instruments of power, but as persons who also 
experience the violence of the state.  
As with every story, the story of the crisis, as well as the story of 
repression of resistance and dissent, has more than one side. The side of 
the protesters, the side of the people on the streets, of those who have 
been resisting to austerity policies of the past five years is well known 
(e.g. Dalakoglou 2012; Douzinas 2013; Gourgouris 2011; 
Theodossopoulos 2014). Greece has made the headlines often enough in 
the past five years for the European and global public to be familiar with 
pictures of riots and violent clashes with the police. However, little is 
known about the story of those who have been called upon to deal on a 
daily basis with the public manifestations of widespread social 
  4 
discontent.
1
 A common explanation for viewing the police in a 
stereotypical and largely monolithical perspective has been their 
recourse to the use of violence: the police is represented as an 
institution where violence is endemic, and indeed structural violence is 
part and parcel of the way policemen perform their duties. However, 
structural violence is also the way the police hierarchy – with its often 
authoritarian structures – works on police themselves. I would like to 
argue, then, that while police oppression is one commonsensical part of 
the story, it does not provide us with a sociological explanation that 
would allow us to discern the larger political stakes at play or to assess 
and question the use of the police from the State, especially during 
times of crisis of the political system. But I am running ahead of my 
argument, and before this story is told, I need to reflect on those 
methodological and ethical considerations that are raised during 
engagement with controversial subjects 
2. Controversial topics, controversial subjects: 
methodological and ethical considerations 
 
Because the topic of the research focuses on experience, I found it 
necessary to use an inductive approach that allows the data – that is the 
voice and the experience of the participants – to guide the emergence of 
explanations. As my aim was to see and account for subjects rather than 
objects of research, my theoretical framework was informed by the 
questions and concerns of interpretive sociology and the Weberian 
tradition that gives precedence to the production of social meanings and 
                                                 
1
 With the exception perhaps of a focus on the new subject of transnational protesting emerging with 
the alter-globalisation movement, and its relationship with the police, see Della Porta et al. (2006).  
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the ways reality is constructed, lived and narrated by the social subjects, 
along with a phenomenological interest in experience. As such, the 
project aimed to shed light on the ways that police officers and those 
who interact with them construct the meaning of their special role, 
particularly as they are called upon to mediate – albeit in a repressive 
manner – between the State and its alienated and discontent citizens 
during the most important crisis of the political system in contemporary 
Greece.  
As explained above, police experience is a controversial topic in 
sociological research on Greece.  How does one go about researching 
and writing on a taboo subject? Before I address these ethical concerns 
in relation to the engagement with controversial subjects, let me discuss 
briefly the methodological and technical aspects of my fieldwork. 
Data so far has been collected mainly via thirty semi-structured 
interviews. Along with semi-structured interviews, I conducted sixty 
unrecorded unstructured interviews and (so far) seventeen months of 
ethnographical observation. An ethnographic approach is the most 
appropriate in order to gain a close and intimate familiarity with a 
specified group of individuals, for example an occupational group. In this 
case, it gave me access to a firmly defined and relatively isolated social 
group—the Greek police—and their practices through an intensive 
involvement with people in their cultural environment (Atkinson 1990; 
Hobbs 1998; Wacquant 1995). Additionally, four focus groups of three to 
seven participants were conducted in the exploratory stages of the 
project in order to test the main themes of discussion for the interviews 
but also to elicit a multiplicity of responses and break through issues that 
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are hard to raise in interviews, such as the case of the relationship 
between the far-right and the police (Farnsworth and Boon 2010; 
Smithson 2000). I have also had some experience of riot police 
operations, as I followed a squad during the commemoration of the 17
th
 
of November (in 2014), a date that symbolises the end of the 
dictatorship and the restoration of democratic rule. It is perhaps the 
most potent symbolic expression of anti-authoritarian rule, and given 
the role that the police played in implementing aspects of the repression 
during the Colonels’ dictatorship, the police is the target of such yearly 
demonstrations. I also followed riot police squad operations in April 
2015, a few months after SYRIZA’s ascent to power, when a wave of 
occupations of public buildings, universities and SYRIZA’s headquarters 
organised by anarchist groups resulted in numerous skirmishes with the 
police. 
Ethnographic methods are ideal to gain a bottom-up view, to achieve 
what anthropologists call a ‘thick description’ (Geertz 1973) that gives 
insight into practices, the construction of meanings, relationships within 
groups, strategies of inclusion and exclusion, and a general 
understanding of a culture in a holistic perspective. However, 
ethnography also requires a great deal of time, commitment, and in this 
case, the willingness to accept the inability to plan in advance. As police 
officers only find out about their shifts the night before, participating in 
their routines requires the flexibility and commitment to follow this 
exhausting schedule. That of course gives further insight into the way 
the insecurity and instability of the quotidian lives of this particular 
social group. The other well-known issue in ethnographical work is the 
risk, through a period of immersion in a particular way of life and 
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experience, of beginning to see the world through their eyes. I see this 
to a certain extent as unavoidable while the data collection phase is 
ongoing. Empathy is a necessary aspect of any anthropological or 
sociological work, allowing the researcher to narrate the others’ side of 
the story. However, the necessary analytical distance is restored once 
the process of data analysis and writing resumes.  
Access, of course, was another complicated issue from the start: given 
the general mistrust of the public towards the police, but also the 
cultural and professional mistrust of the police towards outsiders, access 
to the field has been a main concern from the start. My first point of 
contact was the officers I had met at a workshop on riots in Athens 2014 
that was the initial trigger for this research project. However, the break-
through was achieved through a contact with a journalist who runs a 
very popular police internet site, with the ambiguous name ‘bloko’ 
which means barricade – a word used during clashes by both police and 
protesters. This meeting was crucial in enabling me to build the basis of 
my own network, which as time passed grew in numbers and diversity of 
participants. Recommendation and trust are paramount when one 
works with close-knit groups, even more so when there are questions of 
security and confidentiality. So far, I have had extremely few cases of 
refusal of participation. There were methodological concerns at the 
beginning, due to the nature of snowball sampling, which was chosen 
because of the difficulty of accessing the group under study but which 
risks having homogeneity of responses. However, these concerns were 
surpassed with the development of the network of participants, which 
gave access to different services and ranks of the hierarchy.  
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Let me now move on to ethical considerations and address questions of 
reflexivity. These concern the position of the researcher when he or she 
engages with topics and subjects whose ethical legitimacy is 
questionable and whose relation to power is an innate source of 
controversy. Law enforcement officers are a group whose peculiar place 
between enforcing order and being powerless in relation to the orders 
of hierarchical power produces a constant tension not only within the 
subjects themselves but also to the researcher, who constantly feels she 
has to navigate on ‘shaky ground’ whilst empathising with those people 
who share their stories and everyday concerns with her. As will be 
explained below, at the heart of such considerations lies the problem of 
violence and the peculiar role of police officers as agents cum 
instruments of State repression, as representatives of lawfulness and in 
charge of policing social boundaries. The challenges and perils 
associated with researching controversial subjects such as the police 
have been long discussed in anthropological literature. Jeffrey Sluka 
(1999), for instance, has written about ‘humanizing the inhumane’, while 
Antonius Robben (1996) has reflected on the ‘ethnographic seduction’ of 
establishing good rapport and its effect on the researcher’s critical 
detachment. However, as Jauregui (2013) persuasively argues, such a 
position entails the problematical assumptions that clear lines between 
perpetrators and victims of violence can always be drawn (Mamdani 
2002; Das 2007) or that the distinction between the researcher and the 
participants can guarantee objectivity.  
This space of ethical indeterminacy raises numerous questions, such as: 
How do we conduct research with participants who perform violence on 
a daily basis? How do we react when our own political views are 
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challenged and ethical certainties become less solid? How do we 
account for the sensibilities, moral impasses, vulnerabilities and 
responsibilities of those social agents for whom violence – often against 
people and groups with whom we sympathise – is routinized whilst 
trying to construe and analyse their practices? These questions are 
constantly present when one does fieldwork with controversial subjects: 
they are present not only in encounters with police officers, but they are 
also present each time the researcher presents her work to academic or 
lay publics. In the past seventeen months since I started my research 
project, I was called to respond almost daily to criticism for my 
engagement with the police (‘how is it even possible that you even talk 
to them?’, or ‘why do you legitimise them by making them your 
interlocutors?’) and to hard-core stereotyping, such as ‘do they even 
have a brain?’. 
Such views also force the researcher to face a long-standing ethical and 
political question, pertinently posed by Becker’s classic essay ‘Whose 
Side Are We On?’ (Becker 1967). Or to put it differently, as Fassin framed 
it in his own ethnography of the French anticrime squad, ‘for whom do 
we write?” (Fassin 2013). Where does the researcher’s loyalty lie when 
engaging with controversial subjects? As practitioners of qualitative 
research know all too well, there is no such a thing as ‘pure’ or ‘innocent’ 
science, especially when dealing with the messiness of human existence; 
even engagement with ‘clean’ causes and insider research is bound to 
entangle the researcher in the expectations and micro-politics of any 
given community or group, however marginalised or powerful it may be, 
and regardless of the rightfulness of their cause (Islam 1999). This, 
naturally, does not mean that ethical engagement is neutralised, but it 
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does entail navigating through often conflicting moral logics. Ethical 
engagement also means willingness to question one’s moral high ground 
to allow those ‘Others’ to be heard in their own terms and to contribute 
to the knowledge produced by the researcher.  
 
3. «Μπάτσοι, γουρούνια, δολοφόνοι»: the historical and 
political context of police hate in Greece 
 
Construing the symbolic role of the police in the Greek political universe 
and its lack of legitimacy by large parts of the public requires a 
contextualization of the issue within the longue durée of policing politics 
in Greece in the twentieth century (Mazower 1997; Mouzelis 1979; 
Samatas 1986; Veremis 1997). The collective trauma of the Civil War 
(1946-1949), which followed the end of the Second World War, has 
rigidly defined the political identities and symbolic universes of the Left 
and Right in Greece. The political persecution of the Left in the years 
that followed the end of the Civil War has been associated in the 
collective memory of the Left with the police, as the instrument of the 
State implementing aspects of such persecution. Equally, the police has 
been used for the execution of practices of political repression in the 
interwar years, initially by the implementation of the law of Idionymo in 
1929, which penalised the support and dissemination of subversive – 
i.e., communist and anarchist – ideas; and subsequently by the 1936-
1941 Metaxas dictatorship, which imposed the infamous ‘statements of 
repentance’ and the institution of exile camps on isolated islands with 
the purpose of morally reforming dissenters. The latter practice was also 
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used by the post-Civil War regime. Later on, the colonels’ dictatorship 
(1967-1974), which ruthlessly supressed democratic political dissent in 
Greece, further consolidated the popular perception of the police as a 
repressive State apparatus. These particular historical experiences, as 
well as the swinging of the pendulum since the restoration of democracy 
in Greece towards an ideological hegemony of the Left
2
, have 
contributed toward not only mistrust, but often open hostility between 
the police and the progressive side of the political spectrum. The police 
has occupied a structural role in the symbolic universe of Left political 
dissent, be it parliamentary, communist, extra-parliamentary, or with 
anarchist leanings. There is practically no example of public 
demonstration in Greece that does not take a turn against the police: 
the slogan ‘και τώρα ένα σύνθημα που όλου̋ μα̋ ενώνει, μπάτσοι, 
γουρούνια, δολοφόνοι’, translating ‘and now a slogan which unite us all, 
cops, pigs, murderers’ in its countless variations, is evoked almost in a 
ritualistic manner, and is perhaps the most instructive instance of the 
symbolic role the police holds in the universe of political dissent in 
Greece. Additionally, the persistence of political terrorism in Greece 
(Kassimeris 2001, 2013), which often takes the police as its primary 
target, along with the special place of the anarchist subculture in Greece 
that had enjoyed – at least up to the Marfin events in 2012 -   a peculiar 
and ethical legitimacy (Boukalas 2011; Trocchi 2011; Vasilaki 
forthcoming), have further contributed to consolidating popular 
representations of ‘the police versus the people’ cliché. Last, but not 
least, one should not leave outside the picture the particular cultural 
understandings of lawfulness in Greece, where the law is not seen as 
                                                 
2
 Albeit not in terms of political power per se, at least not until January 2015 and Syriza’s ascent into 
power. 
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absolutely prohibiting or set in stone but as negotiable and malleable, 
while its institutional representatives are a priori mistrusted.  
Even though the process of recruitment of police officers was radically 
revised in the 1980s, allowing for the transformation of the body along 
with structural reforms that diminished the autonomy of the police 
(Zianikas 1995; Stergioulis 2001), the public’s suspicion towards the 
police has remained largely unchanged. Since the restoration of 
democratic rule, ‘hate against the police’ often functions as a kind of 
ideological glue for political formations and movements that situate 
themselves on the left of the political spectrum. As a result, incidents of 
police violence are viewed a priori as systemic, with little examination of 
those cases or of the police culture itself, which is automatically 
considered authoritarian and anti-democratic. A paradox of such 
assumptions is, for instance, that although the army was the main 
instigator of coup d’états that resulted in dictatorships in Greece, public 
perceptions shared by the Left and the Right regard the army as bearer 
of a democratic political ethic in contrast to the police. This has given the 
police a role that is not only stereotypical but essentially structural in the 
articulation of the political landscape in Greece: every mention of the 
police is almost always negative, while challenging the stereotype of 
‘fascist cop’ is an extremely sensitive endeavor. 
This established problematical relationship between the police and the 
public deteriorated further in recent years. The 2008 Athens riots, which 
followed the shooting of a teenager by a police officer in central Athens, 
spread across the country for almost a month. At the same time, they 
acquired international resonance and immense symbolic value in the 
  13 
universe of dissent to State violence and police brutality and as a result 
heavily affected the already strained relationship between the police 
and the public. The 2008 riots marked a shift in a number of ways: first, 
in legitimising both violent expressions of discontent and repressive 
responses from the state; second, in normalising the over-policing of 
demonstrations and the regular use of specialised riot police forces as 
well as the specialised motorcycle police forces, the DELTA teams 
(abolished in October 2015); and third, in causing a break – yet 
unrepaired – in the relationship between the public and the police. This 
event has also consolidated the idea of the police as an obscure, 
parastate institution rather than an essential pillar in the functioning of a 
democratic state, an institution serving and guaranteeing the rule of law 
(Vasilaki forthcoming). 
The economic crisis and the social turmoil it generated have been 
translated into a proliferation of protests that often have taken the 
police as their target. The retreat of the Welfare State and the 
determination of Greece’s governments to push the austerity agenda, 
along with a 35% drop of the GDP that touched an unprecedented 
variety of social groups and strata, have left the police as the only visible 
representative of the State and made them the unwilling protagonist of 
the crisis as well as the unwilling enemy of the people. The turn of a part 
of the police force to the far right– which has been highly mediatised to 
the point of resembling a moral panic, as it will be analysed further 
below – along with the belated reaction of the government to the 
criminal activities of the Golden Dawn, has further exacerbated the 
stereotyping of police as harbouring sympathy for undemocratic, 
authoritarian political formations.  
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Along with such developments, the dogma of ‘astynomokratia’ (‘police 
omnipresence’) has not only substantially increased the numbers of the 
riot squad but also turned ordinary police officers into agents of 
repression, thus further contributing to the conflation between police as 
a service and police as a repressive state apparatus. The policing of 
protests reflects to a certain extent the relationship between the state 
and society. The social contract between the sovereign and the people 
constitutes the bedrock of modern states and as such, if the sovereign 
power violates this contract, its legitimacy to govern can be challenged. 
It is well established in the relevant literature that heavy-handed and 
confrontational approaches affect negatively the legitimacy of the 
government/State (Reiner 1998). The rise of civil rights movements 
along with the professionalization of the police are considered major 
factors in the shift of policing practices from a confrontational to a non-
confrontational model of policing (Sombatpoonsiri 2015). Even though 
the modern state’s legitimacy partially arises from its ability to sustain 
public order through rigid policing, rather than from its facilitation of 
public manifestation of grievances, research on state repression 
invariably points out that authoritarian responses following the ‘law and 
order’ viewpoint, result in authorizing excessive use of force against 
protesters and dissidents (Churchill and Vander 1990; Davenport 2005; 
Earl 2003; Kowalewski 2003; Sluka 1999). Previous experiences of 
policing, the nature of social conflict as well as technological changes in 
crowd control contribute into forming the balance between what is 
known as the escalated force or confrontational approach, and the 
negotiated management or non-confrontational approach 
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(Sombatpoonsiri 2015; for a problematization of such dichotomizing see 
Vitale 2005).  
When protests are seen as legitimate – as they are seen by the vast 
majority in Greece – forceful, repressive responses from the State via 
the use of the police undermine the legitimacy of both the 
State/government and the police. The appeal of the grammar and 
language of public order and disorder, of lawfulness and anomie, of crisis 
and normality that may be convincing – paradoxically – in times of 
stability, can be seriously challenged and have the opposite result in 
times of turmoil, precariousness and generalised insecurity. The use of 
police by the State during the 2010-2014 period reflects precisely the 
choices of a political system in crisis of legitimation.3  
4.  ‘We are disposables’: the views and experiences of police 
officers 
 
The most important aspect of this research was the impact of the crisis 
within the police. As such, one of the key topics of conversation were 
the police officers’ view of the protesters: the unanimous response in 
both recorded interviews and unrecorded conversations were the 
expression of sympathy, identification and solidarity with the protesters, 
especially with those who have been reacting to austerity measures. In 
most conversations, policemen told me that they disagreed with the fact 
                                                 
3
 When a new government from the Left came to power in Greece in January 2015, it originally 
adopted a non-confrontational approach. That approach, however, has been put to the test, initially 
by the wave of anarchist occupations of public buildings, especially universities, as well as the 
governing party’s headquarters. The recent turn of the governing party to austerity politics has 
already turned the mood of the public: activists took to the streets again, and further protests are 
very likely to occur as the austerity agenda is crystallised to specific policies. 
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the protests had to be supressed and they expressed their 
disappointment that they are less populous and less dynamic since 2012. 
“How is it possible to disagree with the protesters? They represent 
all of us; my mother whose pension has been cut; my brother in 
law who was made redundant; and ourselves, we have suffered a 
lot since the beginning of the crisis” [S.G., Riot Police] 
The ‘αγανακτησμένοι’ - the Greek indignados - were a frequent topic of 
discussion and the suppression of their movement was unanimously 
considered by police officers to be the work of what has come to be 
known as the ‘παρακράτο̋’ (para-State).  
“The ‘αγανακτησμένοι’ were our hope; every one stood up 
together; but this hope died as soon as the ‘επεισόδια’ (violent 
incidents) started. Who have started these incidents? The usual 
suspects, the ‘parakratos’” [G.B., OPKE-Violent Crime and Rapid 
Response Unit]. 
Such views are supported by the fact, as police officers say, that they 
often have clear orders not to proceed to arrests during violent 
incidents, while this is entirely possible. Despite the fact that they 
recognise their role as protectors of the State, they see the State, the 
government, as largely unfair and as holding a suspicious political 
agenda. They often refer to the ‘επεισόδια’ (violent incidents) as a 
‘παράσταση’, as a show where everybody plays their role and the media, 
especially the news shows, typically airing between 7-9pm in Greece, 
capitalise on that.  
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“It is a ‘show’ and we play our role; every one play their role; the 
anarchists, the media, the political parties. Everything on time for 
8pm” [M.I., Riot Police] 
Surprisingly their view on violent incidents and riots is similar to the 
typical Left argument: that these happen in order to disorient the public 
view and draw attention away from the political issue at stake, for 
instance, the anti-popular austerity measures. 
“Violent incidents occur in order to manipulate the public; so that 
the government can pass the memorandum bills at the 
parliament” [G.T., Riot Police] 
Despite the openly expressed sympathy for the protesters, police 
officers tend to divide them into two categories: those who protest for 
their rights and those who clash with the police. Indeed, as anyone who 
has participated in or observed demonstrations in Greece would have 
observed, the escalation of tension leads invariably to clashes with the 
police. That escalation is routinely associated with a distinctive group 
mainly composed of anarchists and ‘αντι-εξουσιαστικό̋ χώρο̋’, the 
extra-parliamentary far left. The latter's presence is constant in all 
demonstrations in Greece, and the group is known to often initiate 
violent incidents that turn into clashes. I witnessed this myself when I 
followed the 17
th
 November commemoration in 2014. The tension and 
then clash is fabricated, as the so-called tension is not an individual or 
spontaneous expression. Rather, there is preparation, including sartorial 
preparation that copies police riot gear, as well as organisation on the 
level of the attack and its aftermath. The long-lasting vendetta between 
the anarchist movement and the police, as part of the peculiar 
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subculture in Greece and the historical cum political causes of this 
antagonism, is often commented upon by police officers who feel that 
this legacy haunts them today. They point out how unfair they find their 
association with the role played by the institution in the past, long 
before they joined the force and became officers.  
“Why am I even held accountable for the wrong doings of the 
police half a century ago? I was not even born then. How is this 
fair? It is not, but who cares? It is convenient to see us this way” 
[D.K., DIAS-Motorcycle Police]  
They firmly believe that such association not only feeds on deep-rooted 
stereotypes, but also that such stereotypes are used by political parties 
and the media to fabricate easy targets. Police violence sells, they say, 
and it also disorients from pressing political issues. 
Naturally, dealing with the paradox of having to repress a demonstration 
or protest with which one agrees and may identify, at least to the extent 
that the crisis has hit everyone in the lower and middle classes in 
Greece, is not an easy thing to do. How do police officers deal with these 
contradictions? The standard response is that they follow orders. 
Indeed, the strictly hierarchical nature of the institution does not allow 
for negotiation or criticism. However, the arbitrariness of orders, and 
especially the overuse of riot police for any kind of protesting and 
without discriminating amongst types of demonstrators, was something 
that was widely commented upon and criticised. In the case, for 
instance, of those groups that have become symbols of resistance to 
austerity politics in Greece such as the retired, or those civil employees 
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such as cleaners who have been made redundant, the omnipresence of 
the police was largely criticised as both inefficient and unethical. 
“What is the business of the riot police in policing cleaners or the 
elderly? We are a repressive force, we are designed, trained for 
clashes, for hard-core situations. Once you get the riot police on 
the streets, there is no turning back. Why do they use us against 
peaceful or weak people?” [V.M. Riot Police] 
At the same time, many of the police I interviewed viewed repression of 
demonstrations as a strategy of the State or the government to use the 
police as a scapegoat. The police become the hard face of the State, at 
the same time systematically disorienting public opinion and directing 
anger away from those responsible for the economic crisis.  
“When the Welfare State withdraws, the police is on the streets. 
We are the most visible facet of the State. We are there to be 
hated” [T.D. Greek MI5 in charge of dealing with public 
disturbance] 
In that sense, what I gathered from the interviews is the frustration, 
even anger amongst police at the way they have been used in the past 
four or five years. I found, as well, a disillusionment with politics – a 
disillusionment that is also associated with the rise of anti-systemic 
political parties, within the police but also in a broader manner within 
Greek society, as explained in the following section. For many of the 
police officers, violence is seen as a tool that needs to be used with 
caution, and they put the blame for their over-reaction on the political 
leaders as well as their superiors who organise the operations in a 
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manner that produces violence. For instance, they often mention how 
long they have to wait before intervening, as they are ordered to stand 
eight or twelve or even fourteen hours without a break, all the time 
absorbing the symbolic, psychological and physical violence directed at 
them by the protestors. Intervention after such exhaustion, they say, is 
bound to produce violence.  
“Have you ever had to stand there for hours, eight, ten, twelve, 
fourteen hours, under the rain of stones thrown at you? No water, 
no toilet, just standing there, rain or shine? Then, once we are 
released from the chain, we become wild dogs” [Y.I. former Riot 
Police] 
“Operations are designed in a way that makes us violent. We are 
few against many. We are not allowed to intervene on time. And 
then, when things escalate beyond control, violence is 
unavoidable” [Y.S. Riot Police] 
Another reason for the frustration expressed is the hierarchical nature of 
the institution, with an important divide between high and low rank 
officers. In all my interviews and discussions this topic came up as of first 
importance: on the one hand, the discontent and frustration, even 
anger, of those at the base of the pyramid who lift the weight of not 
always rational or appropriate orders; on the other hand, the contempt 
of those at the top of the hierarchy towards those at the bottom. It is 
interesting that these feelings are widely shared by the participants and 
they are expressed with similar vocabulary: lower rank unanimously 
express disappointment and the conviction that their own work 
conditions and even lives are disposable for the sake of the careers of 
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those at the top who never dare to counter the interventions and 
decisions of political authorities. 
“What do these people know from the comfort of their offices? 
They do not give a damn about us. They are only interested in their 
careers” [P.P. Riot Police] 
Those at the top tend to say that lower rank officers lack the ability to 
access situations in a holistic manner; as they contend, low rank officers 
lack perspective. 
“Do you see this view? [interview on the top floor of the Police 
Headquarters in Athens] I have this view because I am on the top 
floor; those on the pavement cannot see what I am able to see, I 
am standing at the top. This is why I am giving orders and they are 
following them” [P.S. Head of service, Police Headquarters] 
Indeed, the structure of the education system within the police 
reinforces such ideas. The idea of hierarchy is not only embedded 
through education but reflected in the way the structure of the police 
works, in possibilities of progression, salaries, benefits, and above all 
behaviour: who has the right to speak, to express an opinion, to 
disagree. This becomes a point of friction, as high rank police officers 
rarely have the experience of the streets – as they say in the professional 
slang – and they have little interest or consideration to hear the 
objections, advice or ideas of those who experience the difficulties of 
everyday policing.  
The arbitrariness of orders and the nature of the relationship between 
low and high rank police officers is also an effect of the clientelist state, 
  22 
which is endemic in the very way Greek public administration has 
functioned since its inception. Because of the relative isolation of the 
police as an institution, the workings of the clientelist state of the past 
forty years are particularly prominent. Promotions but especially 
placement within specific services is always an effect of networking and 
client-patron relationships. The nepotistic way in which placement 
occurs in turn creates tensions between those who work in coveted 
positions such in the secret service or anti-terrorist units, both services 
which are considered to be less dangerous and onerous than serving on 
the streets. For that matter, MAT, the riot police is considered as the 
service where those with no connections go, whereas it is equally 
difficult to leave that service without connections. For this reason, the 
riot police unit is also one that is despised by policemen from other 
branches. In that sense, the riot police experience a double 
marginalisation, becoming the scapegoat par excellence. Recurrent 
expressions such as ‘we are disposables’, ‘punching bags’, ‘scapegoats’, 
‘we exist so as to be hated’ demonstrate the level of deep 
disappointment within the police forces.  
In modern social theory, violence – as far as police is concerned – is 
viewed in a rather monolithical manner, often with limited reflection of 
what makes violence possible, within the institution but also within the 
broader political context. Foucauldian (2008) approaches revolve around 
the concept of governmentality and see police violence as the effect of 
the emergence of disciplining institutions of the modern State, and its 
technologies of surveillance and control. For critical theorists such as 
Benjamin (1978), the police is seen as intrinsically ‘ignoble’ because of its 
authority to ‘make law’ rather than merely enforce law. Derrida (2002) 
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also concurs with this view by observing that even if the police does not 
make the law, it acts like the lawmaker of modern times, since each time 
the law is indeterminate enough to open a possibility for the police to 
make the law.  
These perspectives, however, offer little room to examine the police 
officers’ experience expressed via tropes such as ‘it is my duty’ or that 
‘violence is part of the job’, or that ‘violence is a tool’. What comes out 
of the narratives of police officers in relation to clashes and violent 
incidents is that overlapping rationalities are at play in addition to 
professional duty—necessity, morality, a sense of camaraderie,  survival 
instincts in moments of clash—as well as strong emotional states such as 
fear, anger, anxiety, insecurity and even loss of control. Violence 
exercised and inflicted and its effects are constitutive of the police 
officers’ subjectivity and sense of professional self. It is not simply the 
case of ‘using bad means to achieve good ends’—protecting the 
majority’s vote, the polity, public property and so on—a reasoning 
framework that allows police officers to make sense of their own use of 
violence and come to terms with what they perceive as their own moral 
failure when they consider their violence excessive. Police officers have 
to navigate between limited resources, contradictory orders, the 
arbitrariness of superiors, and the blame from politicians and the media. 
It is a constant negotiation between power and powerlessness, partial 
knowledge (often they do not know what is going on), conflicting moral 
codes, and contradictory orders, all of which are defensively covered by 
an expressed sense of ‘doing one’s duty’. As far as the police are 
concerned—and especially the riot police who have to take instant 
decisions with a high risk of misjudgement—boundaries between 
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perpetrator and victim are often unclear, while decisions depend always 
on the situation. When is violence an ‘excess’, when is it justifiable, who 
decides, at what price and who pays the price of excess? And is it even 
possible to entirely control violence when social agents such as police 
officers are authorised to use it in the name of rights, democracy, 
justice, order and so on? For police, who are sanctioned to use violence 
in the name of collective values and principles within the historical 
context of the nation-State, the legitimacy of violence is always a 
slippery ground, indeterminate, and morally conflicting for the ones who 
exercise it. Understanding violence as productive in the formation of 
subjectivities such as those of police officers does not constitute an 
excuse for violence. Neither does it relativise it. It does, however, 
complicate the picture and call into question the absolute binaries of 
‘good’ and ‘evil’, or ‘right’ and ‘wrong’. 
5. The spectre of far Right within the police in Greece: the 
Golden Dawn Crisis 
 
In parallel with the lived experience of dealing with the crisis, the issue 
of the relationship between the Greek police and the Golden Dawn was 
naturally prominent in the interviews and discussions with police 
officers, given the political gravity of the issue, but also the intense 
attention given to the topic by the media. Golden Dawn is a political 
party that enjoyed high popularity in the past years in Greece, and 
indeed police officers, especially those of the riot police, have voted for 
them in considerable numbers. Estimations vary, and they are based on 
the results of two polling stations (Ampelokipoi and Kaisariani) where 
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the riot police officers vote in Athens (though not exclusively). 
Percentages fluctuate between 15.4% and 23.7%, and according to 
certain – considerably popular - calculations the ‘pure police vote’ may 
be up to 50%. This is, however, an extrapolation; these percentages 
cannot be certified whilst they cannot provide a satisfactory explanation 
of the phenomenon. What is more interesting—and politically 
necessary—is to ask why these ideas are popular, what is the context 
that makes them appealing, and why the police are both more 
vulnerable and more targeted in relation to the far Right. For this, 
however, it is crucial to refrain from the moral panic disseminated by the 
media and echoed in parts of progressive political spectrum. For while it 
may be politically expedient to denounce this problematic relationship, a 
certain analytical distance is necessary on the level of interpretative 
sociological inquiry, since understanding takes more than moral 
indignation. A distinction between voters and ideologues is also 
necessary before one rushes to label the police as fascist in a totalising 
manner: voting takes conviction but it is very different from fully 
embracing the ideas and intentionally taking part in far Right violent 
actions.  
Certainly, my fieldwork suggests that many of the Golden Dawn ideas 
are popular within the police. The reasons explaining why police officers 
may feel sympathetic towards the Golden Dawn were discussed at 
considerable length during interviews and informal discussions. The 
most frequently recurring responses focused around four aspects. First, 
interviewees clearly responded to the anti-systemic attitude of the 
Golden Dawn.  
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“They fight the system. The political system of the country is 
corrupt. These politicians are traitors. And the Golden Dawn has 
said that clearly and without fear” P.D.2, DELTA-Rapid Response 
Motorcycle Unit] 
Anger, as well as frustration towards at what is perceived as the political 
use of the police, as explained above, were mentioned as probably the 
most potent factors inducing sympathy towards the Golden Dawn. The 
Golden Dawn discourse focuses attention on the collapse of legitimacy 
of the political system during the years of the crisis; the depreciation of 
what is perceived as a cohort of corrupted politicians; and the rejection 
of the ‘educated elites’ who have ‘sold out the country’. Moreover, 
Golden Dawn expressions of admiration for acts that ‘shamed’ the 
‘traitors’ of the country was the most significant motive for ‘giving a 
chance’ to a party that seemed to gain the status of ‘punishers’.   
Second, the use of patriotic discourse and symbols was mentioned as a 
key element in developing sympathy towards the Golden Dawn. 
“They are patriots. No one can question that. They may have other 
problems but they love the country. And so we do. They have 
respect for the traditions, for our flag, for our history. This is why 
we feel close to them. Although, one could also say that they just 
use patriotism for their own purposes” [C.D., DIAS, Motorcycle 
Police]  
Patriotism as well as nationalism are particularly popular ideologies 
within the security forces for obvious reasons related with the particular 
mission of such institutions in the functioning of the modern State. The 
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systematic use of symbols such as the flag or the national anthem; the 
strategic invocation of heroic or tragic moments of Greek history; and 
perceptions of increasing multiculturalism and the ideological hegemony 
of political correctness as a threat have established the Golden Dawn as 
the bearer of patriotic pride par excellence.  
Third, the Golden Dawn’s anti-immigration stance was also discussed as 
a significant feature in assessing the popularity of the far Right within 
the police. The anti-immigration feeling was mainly expressed as fear of 
losing national cum cultural identity rather than being associated with 
the economic crisis and its consequences, such as unemployment. Anti-
immigration was also distinguished from racism in all exchanges, and 
this could be attributed to an unclear understanding of what kind of 
function racism performs in societies in crisis and what racism entails, 
but also to the concern to distance themselves from the political 
stigmatisation of racism.  
“Immigration is an issue because the numbers are large. Soon we 
will not recognise our own country. There are no jobs, what are we 
going to do? What are they (the immigrants) going to do here? 
The so-called progressive do not want to raise this issue. And the 
Golden Dawn – yes, it is not right that they have attacked those 
people (the immigrants), I do not like that, I do not agree with that 
– but they are targeted because they raise the issue” [P.D.2 DELTA-
Rapid Response Motorcycle Unit] 
Fourth, the police officers I interviewed admit that the Golden Dawn has 
been putting forward a profile appreciative of the police - and broadly of 
the security forces. Given the generalised social isolation police officers 
  28 
experience, analysed above, this is an additional reason explaining their 
emotional identification.  
“They are friendly. They like us. What do you expect when 
everyone else is targeting us? When the Left are calling us pigs and 
murderers, is it strange that we turn to them (the Golden Dawn)?” 
[M.L., DIAS-Motorcycle Police]  
Nazism as an ideology, or fascism for that matter, was never mentioned 
as an acknowledged or conscious ideological affiliation. What emerged 
from the interviews was a very limited understanding of how these 
elements, considered the key factors of the Golden Dawn’s appeal, along 
with the popularisation of hate speech, have been or can be combined 
to create an ideological climate of that excludes  otherness and 
encourages aggressiveness and violent responses to those perceived as 
enemies. As far as the representation of the police as a de facto far right 
institution and a Golden Dawn supporter, officers again attributed this 
to media and political party use of the police as scapegoats. As explained 
above, police officers feel that they are easily demonised for their 
repressive role with little public interest to discern between their 
professional role and their own beliefs, contradictions and often 
impasses. Paradoxically, sympathy for the Golden Dawn is considered by 
the police officers as a punishment against those who identify the police 
as far right supporters in the first place. 
However, if we leave aside the Golden Dawn’s use of patriotic symbols 
and their efforts to approach the police, we may ask if the ideas of the 
wholesale rejection of the political system, the anger against 
pauperisation, and the easy scapegoating of immigrants are ones that 
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concern the police only. I submit that the socio-economic and cultural 
conditions are such in Greece that the Golden Dawn has become the 
proxy for those of all social strata who identify on an emotional level 
with the Golden Dawn ideas but do not want to get their hands dirty. 
The Golden Dawn does the dirty work, becoming the proxy of a highly 
xenophobic society that cannot, however, come to terms ideologically 
with its own xenophobia and cannot address it openly. Pointing the 
finger at the police only, an easy target, functions on the level of social 
psychology as a scapegoat: the police become the culprits in question, 
the fascists, and responsibilities -ethical, ideological, political- are not 
sought on a different, deeper and higher level. The media representation 
of the Pavlos Fyssas murder, where the government practically accused 
the police for failures that are primarily political, the unexamined cases 
of the relationship between members of the then government and the 
Golden Dawn indicate that this particular story has a much darker and 
uglier side than what we have been able to see so far.   
The most systematic attempt to address the link between the police and 
the Golden Dawn in Greece (Christopoulos 2014; for a similar argument 
see also Psarras 2012) establishes a continuity in the relationship 
between the two, which goes as far back as the post-Civil War State and 
regards the recent developments as a case of total fascisation of security 
forces in Greece. There is no doubt that the link exists and that 
ideological sympathies with far Right ideas and values are popular within 
the police. There is also evidence that the police has reacted to the 
Golden Dawn actions with lenience; they have also been accused of 
collaboration with the Golden Dawn members and MPs. However, in the 
numerous interviews I have had, although there is acknowledgment of 
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the sympathy with Golden Dawn ideas, the accusation of collaboration 
was forcefully rejected and leniency was attributed to political 
commands (let us not forget that the police is not an independent 
institution).  
I do not wish to underplay the importance of such evidence or 
accusations of collaboration, or the pressing need for democratisation of 
the security forces in Greece. But what I would like to contest here is the 
argument that there is an organic relationship between the far Right and 
the police in Greece. Rather, I would submit that the recent 
developments point towards a circumstantial rather than systemic link. 
Certainly ideologies of exclusion—such as nationalism, xenophobia, 
racism and homophobia—are popular in the culture of the institution. 
However, it is, first, important to distinguish between those ideologies of 
exclusion and the ideologies of fascism or Nazism, albeit their elective 
affinities. Moreover, second, the fact that the police use nationalist 
symbols—e.g., the omnipresent Greek flag, to be found on everything 
from the riot police buses to mobile phone screen savers—should not be 
automatically read as evidence of fascism and may be better understood 
as a form of banal nationalism (Billig 1995). Contrary to the reading that 
sees a systemic relationship and regards the crisis as simply a 
manifestation of such relationship, I would like to argue that the 
particular popularity of the Golden Dawn within the police is precisely a 
manifestation of the crisis. The crisis has become a moment when the 
existing pathogeny of nationalism and other ideologies of exclusion, the 
social isolation experienced of police officers and the wholesale rejection 
and stigmatisation of the police as ‘fascists pigs’, led to a situation where 
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substantial identification with the Golden Dawn became possible within 
Greek society in general and within the security forces in particular. 
6. Conclusion 
 
This article is part of an ongoing research project on policing protests in 
Greece and on the formation of the subjectivity of police officers 
through the exercise of their daily duties. In lieu of provisional 
conclusions of an ongoing project, I would like to conclude with the 
following two observations, stemming from the analysis so far. The first 
observation concerns the extremely low morale and feeling of social 
isolation within the police. Police officers, especially those in front line 
services and most prominently those who work in repressive services, 
such as the riot police, feel discouraged, disappointed, underappreciated 
and used. These feelings have been further exacerbated during the 
crisis, when police have been left as the only visible representative of 
the State and its withering welfare element. In the conditions of the 
crisis, police officers experience with particular intensity their 
paradoxical status: that of powerless instruments of power. In the 
background of such circumstantial experience lies an older and deeper 
sense of social depreciation that leads to feelings of social isolation, a 
peculiar scapegoating, due to the rejection of the institution for the 
historical and political reasons presented in the paper. In this 
perspective, the need to conceive and popularise a new public narrative 
of the police is particularly acute in Greece.  
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The second observation concerns the issue of democratisation: this is an 
extremely sensitive issue, given the sympathy of part of the police for far 
right political formations. However, I contend that democratization, 
should start from the institution itself, from the healthy functioning of 
the institution, from combatting the structural violence embedded in the 
relationships within the police. From what I have come to understand via 
my fieldwork, the arbitrariness of commands within the police force, the 
social exclusion of police officers, the use of the police as a political 
scapegoat, the working conditions, the education that so far has been 
modelled on the army (providing a clear portrayal of the enemy as an 
outsider) need to be immediately reconsidered. The dismantling of the 
clientelist State and the introduction of transparent process of 
promotion, career progression and integration into specific services is of 
paramount importance if we wish to talk seriously of democratisation. 
Putting the emphasis of democratization on policemen individually 
isolates them further, by taking it for granted that they are indeed 
fascists whom an external moral authority has a de facto moral 
superiority and duty to democratise. This naturally raises the issue of 
control of consciousness: in democratic societies we are judged and 
convicted on the basis of acts, and not on the basis of thinking, or 
convictions. Hence, effective democratisation should focus on the 
democratisation of the institution itself and not on reforming the 
consciousness of individual officers. 
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